Network denial-of-service attacks, which exhaust the server resources, have become a serious security threat to the Internet. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has long been introduced in various authentication protocols to verify the identities ofthe communicating parties. Although the use ofPKI can present difficulty to the denial-of-service attackers, the underlying problem has not been resolved completely, because the use ofpublic-key infrastructure involves computationally expensive operations such as modular exponentiation. An improper deployment ofthe public-key operations in a protocol allows the attacker to exhaust the server's resources. This paper presents a public-key based authentication protocol integrated with a sophisticated client puzzle, which together provides a good solution for network denial-of-service attacks, and various other common attacks. The basic strategy to protect against denial of service is to impose an adjustable cost on the attacker while it launches the attacks. The proposed client puzzle protocol can also be integrated with other network protocols to protect against denial-of-service attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is characterized by an explicit attempt of the attackers to prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service [1] . There has been a growing concern about this attack in recent years,
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Denial-of-Service attacks can be classified into three types. These include (i) consumption of scarce resources; (ii) destruction or alteration of configuration information; and (iii) physical destruction or alteration of network components [1] . Any protocol where the server commits extensive computations or memory allocation prior to or as apart of client authentication is vulnerable to network DoS attacks [3] , which corresponds to the first type of denial-of-service attack above. The basic strategy in handling the denial-of-service attack is that the server should require the client to commit its resources before extensive resources could be committed to the client in an authentication protocol session.
TCP connection protocol was reported to be vulnerable to SYN flooding attack in 1996 [4] . This is one of the well-known DoS attacks against a network protocol. During the attack, the attacker sends a huge number of SYN messages to the server to initialize connections and then leaves the subsequently established connections unattended. Since the server allocates buffer space right after the reception of a SYN message, memory of the server can thus easily be exhausted by such connection requests. Juels and Brainard [5] pointed out that the SSL protocol [6] is vulnerable to a similar form of attack. However, it is the CPU resource rather than the memory space, which could be exhausted rapidly because expensive cryptographic operations are required on the server-side in the SSL protocol.
Entity authentication has long been used in communication protocols to tackle different attacks, e.g. the man-in-the-middle attack. Authentication based on the public-key infrastructure is computationally expensive, as the underlying cryptographic operations such as the modular exponentiation involve extensive computations. An attacker may be able to exhaust the computational or memory resources of its target if the underlying authentication or communication protocol is improperly designed. For instance, Ng and Tan's protocol [7] is one that is vulnerable to the resource consumption attack; the server is required to perform public-key decryption right after the reception of the client request message in this protocol. There are several other protocols identified as being vulnerable to this type of attack [8] [9] [10].
Dwork and Naor first introduced the concept of client puzzle to combat junk mail attack [11] . A client puzzle is a small cryptographic problem created by the server in response to a client re quest. The client should first commit its resources to solving the puzzle before completing the remaining part of the communication protocol. While the legitimate users could experience only a slight degradation of service under this scheme, a big cost will be imposed on a denial-of-service attacker who tends to create a huge number of requests within a short duration, because the attacker is required to solve a unique puzzle for each of its service requests. With appropriate adjustment on the puzzle difficulty level, the c1ient puzzle method can handle relatively fast attacks and allow for graceful service degradation. Aura, Nikander and Leiwo [12] proposed a c1ient puzzle and applied it to an authentication protocol. The c1ient puzzle used has an inherent problem that the solution to a puzzle may not exist since the protocol does not verify the existence of a solution during puzzle construction. A later authentication protocol designed also by Aura, Nikander and Leiwo [3] employs a puzzle without the above problem. However, similar to the approach proposed by Matsuura and Imai [10] , the puzzle does not have a difficulty level; so graceful degradation of service would not be possible. The authentication protocol is also vulnerable to denial-of-service attack because the puzzle is not created in a stateless way. Juels and Brainard from the RSA Laboratories proposed a c1ient puzzle protocol to address the TCP SYN attack [5] . This c1ient puzzle protocol does not have the above-mentioned problems; however, there are still other identified defects.
In this paper, we propose an enhanced version of the client puzzle protocol of Juels and Brainard [5] . The defects in Juels and Brainard's protocol will be identified and removed from our c1ient puzzle solution. In addition, a public-key based authentication protocol integrated with our c1ient puzzle protocol would be proposed. The paper further demonstrates how the proposed integrated authentication protocol can resist effectively the network DoS attack and other types of common attacks.
AN IMPROVED CLIENT PUZZLE PROTOCOL
This section presents our c1ient puzzle protocol for handling the denialof-service attacks. This c1ient puzzle can be added on top of an existing network protocol in order to protect the protocol against network DoS attacks.
Protocol Descriptions
Consider the use of our client puzzle to protect a protocol M against the network denial-of-service attacks. To initiate the execution of the protocol M, the c1ient submits its unique identity C in the form of arequest message to the server.
The server then checks the availability of system resources in order to determine the difficulty level k of the c1ient puzzle to be sent out. The resource availability may refer to the availability of memory Of CPU resource or both. Normally, the difficulty level is inversely proportional to the availability of the system resources, allowing a graceful degradation of services during the denial-of-service attacks. In a normal situation, k is set to zero, and no puzzle needs to be solved by the clients.
After the determination of the difficulty level, the puzzle would be constructed using two one-way, collision-resistant hash operations. First, a bit-string zl is generated by the hash operation h ( C, S, t) , where the hash function h would operate on a single input bit-string formed by the concatenation of the parameters C, sand t. Then a second hash operation is performed on zl to produce another bit-string z2. The client identity C is inc1uded in the hash input to make the puzzle c1ient specific so that a solution, for a given puzzle, found by one c1ient cannot be used by other c1ients. Parameter s is the server secret key, which should be long enough (e.g. 128 bits) to prevent brute force attacks. In order to impose a limit time for solving the puzzle by the c1ient, the puzzle should be associated with a timestarnp, t, which is set to the current date and time with aprecision up to a second. The c1ient needs to solve the puzzle before it expires; otherwise, the protocol execution will be terminated no matter whether the returned solution is correct or not.
Assurne the hash output is of length L bits. The puzzle is made up of the hash image z2, the partial pre-image zl<k+l, L>, i.e. the (k+l)th to the L th bits of zl, the timestamp t and the difficulty level k. In this way, the puzzle can be constructed in a totally stateless fashion. It is important to commit as Httle resource as possible in the construction of a puzzle because the DoS attackers intend to exhaust the server resources.
To solve the puzzle, the c1ient finds by brute force a k-bit string z I'< 1, k>, which, when concatenated with the given partial pre-image zl <k+ I, L>, satisfies the following relation:
After solving the puzzle, the solution zl'<I, k> together with the received z 1 <k+ 1, L>, t and k and the client identity C would be sent back to the server for verification.
Before verifying the puzzle solution, the server first checks the timestamp t to see if the puzzle has expired. If T is the maximum allowable time for the client to solve the puzzle and to return the solution, the server must ensure that 't-t T where 't is the current date and time on server side. If the timestamp has not expired, the server performs the same hash operation during puzzle construction using the c1ient-submitted C and t to get the bit-
The last L-k bits of this bit-string (i.e. m<k+ 1, L» are compared with the received zl<k+l, L> to make sure that the timestamp and the client identity are the same as the original ones. After that, the clientpurported solution is verified by checking the equality between h(m) and the output from the hash operation on the bit-string formed by the concatenation of zl '<1, k> and m<k+ 1, L>. If the equality holds, the solution can be assured to be correct; the server can then commit its resources to the client, otherwise, the request is rejected. ...
Prevention of the pre-computation of puzzle solution is a basic puzzle design issue. In our client puzzle protocol, a timestamp t and a long server secret key s are the parameters used in creating the c1ient puzzle. This makes the puzzle component z 1 <k+1, L> unpredictable to the client; and so, the solution cannot be pre-computed. However, if the time parameter T is set to be too large, a client (or attacker) can submit the same solution a number of times before the puzzle expires. So the server should register the pair (C, t) in memory after the solution has been verified correct. This indicates that client C has submitted a correctly solved puzzle created at time t. Before verifying a given solution from any client C, the server should check to ensure that there is not any pair of the form (C, t) in memory for the client as depicted in Figure 1 . This pair (C, t) does not need to be kept in memory for a long time; it will be removed once the puzzle has expired. In theory, upon confirming a given puzzle solution, if T-t = T, then no pair of the form (C, t) needs to be kept for client C. However, if T-t< T, the duration for which (C, t) needs to be stored is (T-(T-t», which is usually a short period.
Comparisons and Improvements
In the client puzzle protocol proposed by Juels and Brainard [5] (referred to as the Juels-Brainard protocol hereafter), a puzzle can be made up of n 1) sub-puzzle(s) each having the same difficulty level k. The probability for an attacker to guessing the solutions correctly is 1/2 kn • To reduce this probability to a certain level, the value of n can be increased. However, the same level can be achieved by increasing the value of k with a smaller n. The laUer approach has the advantage of having a smaller overhead in puzzle transmission because the puzzle size is smaller with a smaller n. Another advantage is the lower cost in puzzle creation and verification because the number of sub-puzzle creation and verification is smaller with a smaller n. It is important to commit as little resource as possible in puzzle creation and verification by keeping n small in order to prevent DoS attack. The cost of this approach is that the average work factor (1 +2 k )n/2 to a client in solving the puzzle is higher for the same 1/2 kn • Our puzzle can be viewed as made up of one single sub-puzzle (n = 1). However, it can be easily extended to one consisting of more than one sub-puzzle by adding an additional sub-puzzle index to the input parameter list of the hash operation during the puzzle construction stage.
To allow for a fair comparison, a puzzle of the Juels-Brainard protocol is meant hereafter to be one consisting of one sub-puzzle only, i.e. n = 1.
In the luels-Brainard protocol, the authors claim that a collision-resistant hash nmction is not a requirement. However, their puzzle solution verification process does not take this claim into account. In the puzzle creation stage of the luels-Brainard protocol, a bit-string x is computed by the server as a hash of a set of service parameters and a server secret key. Then another bit-string y is computed as a hash of x, Le. y = hex). The server then sends this y and part of x to the client who is required to find the remaining part of x by brute force using the equation y = hex'). In the verification stage, the server generates x again and compares it against the client-purported solution x' to determine the correctness of this solution.
However, a non-collision-resistant hash function means that apart from the server-generated x, there could be another x' satisfying the equation y = hex'). So the Juels-Brainard protocol could treat a correct solution as wrong. In our client puzzle protocol, the client-purported solution will not be compared directly with the server-generated x. Instead, an additional hash operation would be performed on the client-purported solution to see whether the output is equal to y. With this modification, a correct solution will not be marked as incorrect even if a non-collision-resistant hash function is used. This modification would also be useful when using a collision-resistant hash function because collision-resistant is not a guaranteed property. Collision could still occur in some claimed collision-resistant hash functions, e.g. MD4 [13] .
In the Juels-Brainard protocol, the elient needs to submit only the found leading k-bit sub-string of x as solution; the remaining L-k bits of x are to be computed by the server during solution verification. When compared with our approach, their solution would be L-k bits shorter. However, it is inappropriate to rely on the server to calculate the remaining L-k bits. Consider the case with the puzzle difficulty level k equal to 1. After solving the puzzle, instead of submitting the solution immediately, the client stores the solution for later use. Suppose after the puzzle has expired, the elient retrieves the solution from storage and submits it. The elient knows that the server could possibly reject the solution as the puzzle has expired. So, before submission, it updates the timestamp t in order to cheat the server. On the server side, the I-bit solution is computed using this fake timestamp, and is then compared with the elient-purported solution. Although the timestamp has been modified, the probability of producing the same I-bit solution as the elient-purported one is still very high. The problem is that the solution is very short. In this example, this probability is 1/2. For k = 2, this probability is 1/2 2 • In general, this probability is 1/2 k • We can see that the lower the value of k, the more severe would be the problem. So one possible solution is to set a bigger lower bound for k (or n in the Juels-Brainard protocol). However, this makes graceful degradation of service difficult and the elients will experience a large degradation of service quality in a short time at the beginning of a potential DoS attack. Therefore, we require the elient to submit both the solution and the received bit-string zl <k+ I, L> instead of the solution z 1 '< 1, k> alone in our protocol. The server should check whether the received bit-string zl <k+ 1, L> matches the server-computed bitstring m<k+ 1, L> before verifying the solution. With such modifications ineluded in our protocol, we consider again the probability of producing a matched m<k+l, L> given the submitted zl<k+l, L> when the timestamp has been modified. Among the 2 L possible values of m, 2 k of them have the sub-string m<k+ 1, L> matching the given z 1 <k+ 1, L>. Assurne the hash outputs are uniformly distributed. The probability of producing a bit-string m, using the fake timestamp, with the last L-k bits (i.e. m<k+ 1, L» matching the client-submitted zl <k+ 1, L> is 1I2L-k. According to this probability 1I2L-k, the higher the value of k, the higher would be the chance of the matching when the modified timestamp is being used to generate the bit-string m. To make this probability elose to zero, we suggest the value of k to be between o and Ll2; and L should have a length of at least 128 bits. In fact, the current common hash functions such as MD5 and SHA have a hash output with a length not less than 128 bits.
Before a puzzle expires, a client could submit the same solution a number of times, leading to multiple allocations of server resources. In the JuelsBrainard protocol, it has a mechanism to prevent multiple allocations of buffer resources. This is done by associating a unique identifier derived from the first request message (M/ in Juels-Brainard protocol notation) to the corresponding allocated buffer slot; and the server ensures that only one buffer slot would be allocated for each request. However, the authors assurne the unavailability of PKI in the design of their protocol because they claimed that PKI could effectively prevent denial-of-service attacks. And no additional benefits could be achieved when using client puzzle in the presence of PKI. In fact, this is not true because the computationally expensive operations such as modular exponentiation in PKI could open up the epu exhaustion attack. The client puzzle protocol could be used to protect a public-key based authentication protocol. In this case, after verifying the puzzle solution, the server may need to perform the expensive public-key cryptographic operations in executing the subsequent authentication protocol. In our protocol, instead of relying entirely on the client request message for the unique identifier, we make use of the high precision requirement (at least up to a second) of timestarnp. The unique identifier is derived from the client unique identity C, which appears in the first request message, and the puzzle timestamp t, which is generated by the server, to form the unique pair (C, t) . This mechanism can reduce the number of parameters in the client request message to a minimal. Whenever a solution has been verified correct, the unique pair (C, t) is stored in memory until the corresponding puzzle expires. As depicted in Figure 1 , the server needs to check for the non-existence of the unique identifier (C, t) for each service request before verifying the puzzle solution. To allow for a rapid search for the existence of an identifier, bucket hashing on the identifiers could be employed. If the existence of a submitted identifier (C, t) can be found, the protocol should be terminated immediately and both epu and memory resources are not allocated. If the client submits a fake (C, t), it cannot pass the subsequent solution verification. Therefore, if a client (or attacker) reuses the same solution before the puzzle expires, the solution will be rejected. Thus multiple allocations of both extensive epu and memory resources would not occur.
THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
The proposed client puzzle protocol can be integrated with or added on top of a network protocol which it protects. In this section, we propose a public-key authentication protocol, and demonstrate how our client puzzle protocol can be securely and properly integrated with the protocol which it protects. If the integration of the client puzzle and the network protocol is not done properly, not only the denial-of-service attacks cannot be prevented, and the underlying protocol may be liable to further security attacks.
Notations
Let kI be the public key of the entity .E, and ki be the corresponding private key. E{w}k I denotes the encryption of message w using the key kI.
NI is a random nonce generated by entity L The other notations are the same as those in the client puzzle protocol.
Protocol Descriptions
The proposed mutual authentication protocol is a challenge-response and timestamp-based authentication protocol. Though a timestamp parameter is employed in the protocol, c10ck synchronization is not required. The proposed authentication protocol consists of 4 message exchanges between the client and the server. The first two are basically the same as the first two messages in the c1ient puzzle protocol depicted in Figure 1 .
It is assumed that the communicating entities have authentie copies of all the required public keys. The authentication protocol begins by c1ient C sending an authentication request message to the server S.
Message 1: C -+ S: C Message 1 of the authentication protocol, the same as the request message in the proposed c1ient puzzle protocol, is used as the authentication request message. In this message, c1ient identity C is used as the only parameter to formulate the authentication request. It serves as a hello message only; and does not trigger the execution of expensive computations or the allocation of memory resources by the server. Otherwise, the integrated protocol could not protect against DoS attacks.
After the reception of the c1ient request, the server performs the same tasks as outlined in the client puzzle section. The tasks inc1ude the determination of the puzzle difficulty level k based on the availability of system resources, and the construction of the client puzzle. If k is set 0, the computation of zl would still be necessary. As mentioned in the client puzzle protocol, the string zl<k+1, L> can be used to validate the timestamp in message 3 on the server side. So it is important to ensure message freshness for protection against replay attacks.
Message 2: S -+ C: zl<k+l, L>, z2, t, k The second message is also the same as the second one in the client puzzle protocol. The server passes the formulated strings zl<k+l, L> and z2 (for k,* 0) together with the timestamp t and difficulty level k to the client.
On reception of message 2, if the difficulty level is greater than zero, the client finds a solution to the puzzle by brute force. Otherwise, no puzzle needs to be solved.
Message 3 from the client puzzle protocol should be enhanced before it can be used in our authentication protocol.. In message 3 of the client puzzle protocol, {z I'< 1, k>, z 1 <k+ 1, L>, t, k, C} is the message that needs to be passed to the server S. To authenticate the client to the server, the client produces a signature ofthe message using its private key, i.e. E{h(zl'<l, k>, zl<k+1,L>, t, k, C, S)}ke· 1 • We emphasize here that the plaintext counterpart (i.e. {zl'<l, k>, zl<k+l, L>, t, k, C, S}) of this encryption must also be submitted to the server. Although the client can still authenticate to the server by sending only the encryption output E{zl'<l, k>, zl<k+l,L>, t, k, C, S}ke·t, the server will then need to perform a computationally expensive public-key decryption operation in order to retrieve the puzzle solution and the timestamp for verification. Denial-of-service attack can then be achieved by repetitively sending bogus encryption outputs to trigger the server executing the decryption operations repetitively. So the plaintext counterpart should also be submitted to allow the server to perform the necessary verifications, like the client puzzle protocol, before performing the expensive public-key decryption in order to authenticate the client.
To prevent replay attack, a nonce Ne is randomly generated and sent to the server. This nonce serves as achallenge to the server, which is to be retumed in the next message. It is signed using the client's private key to form E{h(E{Nc}ks)}ke· 1 • This signature can be combined with the previous signature to form E{h(zl'<l, k>, zl<k+l,L>, t, k, C, S, E{Nc}ks)}ke· 1 • This enhanced message 3 of the client puzzle protocol forms the message that should be sent in the third flow ofthe authentication protocol.
On the server side, the server performs as similar set of verifications like those in the client puzzle protocol as shown in Figure 1 . If k = 0, no solution needs to be verified and the verification h(zl'<l, k>, m<k+l, L» = h(m) can be omitted. After that, the signature of the client is verified.
Message 4: S -+ C: S, C, E{Nc}ks, E{h(S, C, E{Nc}ks)}ks· J
The remaining task of the protocol is to authenticate the server to the client. The client challenge E{Nc}ks is signed by server's private key in order to authenticate the server to the client.
On the client side, if the signature on message 4 is verified to be correct, the server is said to be authentie to the client. Figure 2 shows the overall picture of the proposed authentication protocol. If the submitted solution is incorrect, the execution of the protocol will be terminated. The logic of the proposed authentication protocol has been analyzed and verified formally using the Coffey-Saidha technique [14] . In this section, the protocol is further analyzed against the common set of attacks on an authentication protocol [15] .
Denial-of-Service Attack
This section analyzes the proposed authentication protocol to check if an unauthenticated client (or attacker) could exhaust server resources.
In our authentication protocol, the server receives two messages from the client. After the reception of message 1, no expensive computations are needed. The construction of the puzzle requires just two relatively fast hash operations. Also, the puzzle is eonstrueted in a stateless fashion; so no memory resouree is eonsumed. After the reeeption of message 3, eomputationally expensive publie-key operations are needed to verify the client signature, and memory alloeation is required to store the (C, t) pair. However, these resourees will only be eonsumed after the submitted solution has been verified eorreet, Le. the client eommitment of its resourees has been assured. The non-existenee eheeking of (C, t) and the timestamp eheeking prevent an attaeker from using a previously submitted solution. Therefore, the proposed authentieation protoeol ensures that the server will not be required to eommit its extensive resourees before eonfirming that the c1ient has eonsumed some of its resourees during the authentieation protoeol session. Further, an attaeker eould experienee the risk of exhausting its own resourees if it keeps on issuing authentication requests to the server. However, the server will assign only one eopy of its memory resouree to an authentieated c1ient.
Replay Attack
Replay attaek refers to those attaeks involving the use of information from a single previous protoeol exeeution, on the same or a different verifier [15] .
The basie teehniques to avoid replay attaek inelude the use of the challenge-response teehnique; the use of nonces; and the embedding of target identity in a response message [15] .
In a public-key eryptographic protocol, the potential messages that an attacker may replay are those that the attacker is unable to produee. In our authentieation protocol, messages 3 and 4 are two sueh messages as they are encrypted using private keys unknown to the attaeker.
In message 3 of the proposed authentieation protoeol, there is a bit-string zl<k+l, L> embedded inside the encryption using private-key ke-1 • This bitstring is generated and sent by the server to the c1ient in message 2 of the protocol. It is unpredietable to the client as it is generated using one-way hash funetion with a long server secret key sand eurrent timestamp t as inputs. Also, as shown in Seetion 2.2, the length of zl<k+l, L> must be suffieiently long (at least 64 bits) for the server to deteet a fake timestarnp. The bit-string z 1 <k+ 1, L> thus serves the purpose of a nonee for the server to ensure the freshness of message 3 and so the replay attaek is prevented.
The replay of message 4 is prevented by ehallenge-response teehnique. A long random nonee Ne is generated and sent by the elient to the server in message 3. It is then embedded inside the signature of message 4 in order to assure to the c1ient the freshness of this message.
version of the client puzzle proposed by Juels and Brainard [5] , to tackle the network denial-of-service attack. Our client puzzle protocol has overcome problems inherent in the proposal of Juels and Brainard.
Concerning our proposed integrated authentication protocol, for each protocol execution request from a client, a unique puzzle would be generated and sent by the server to the client. The client must commit its resources to solve the puzzle before expensive computations and memory allocations would be performed by the server. This cost of attack serves as a deterrent to the attacker in carrying out server resource exhaustion attacks. The proposed dient puzzle protocol is quite flexible as the difficulty level ofthe puzzle can be adjusted according to the degree of availability of the server resources. This means that if the attackers manage to consume some of the server resources, the server would increase accordingly the difficulty level of the dient puzzles which would subsequently consume more resources of the attackers. Therefore, the protocol could intelligently monitor the attackers and launch counter through adjusting adaptively the puzzle difficulty level.
The proposed authentication protocol remains stateless and refuses to perform expensive public-key cryptographic computations until the solution of the dient puzzle has been verified. Thus it can resist server resource exhaustion attacks. Besides, the proposed authentication protocol has been able to resist various common attacks. As the DoS attacks have become widely known and can easily be exploited to attack websites and various network protocols, they have created a real problem to protocol design. Protocols vulnerable to DoS attacks could be strengthened with the integration of our proposed dient puzzle protocol. In addition, network protocol designers should consider integrating the proposed client puzzle protocol into their protocols to avoid being harassed by the DoS attackers.
